We examine shareholder activism in the recent split-share structure reform in China.
Introduction
Shareholder activism constitutes an important form of shareholders' e orts to in uence corporate governance. In recent years, Chinese institutional investors have been increasingly involved in corporate governance and rm management as they grow to hold more securities.
1 They are considered a monitoring and disciplinary mechanism of growing importance in the Chinese nancial system, in which takeovers are systematically discouraged and boards are ine ective (Allen et al: (2005) ). In this paper, we take advantage of a special event { the Chinese split-share structure reform { to examine the value of shareholder activism. This unique event, in nature, allows us to avoid the de ciencies in determining activism proxies and in measuring their e ectiveness that plague the previous literature.
The split-share structure has existed since the inception of the Chinese A-share market in the early 1990s.
2 The original purposes of the split-share structure were to enable stateowned enterprises to raise capital and, simultaneously, to allow the Chinese government to retain control of those enterprises. However, it was widely criticized for fostering speculations and agency problems and for hindering M&A activities (Hwang et al: (2006) and Liao et al: (2008) ). In this split-share structure, two classes of domestic A shares with otherwise identical features, tradable and non-tradable, coexist for one company. Transactions of the non-tradable shares are contract-based and subject to approval of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. Approximately 2/3 of the A-shares outstanding were non-tradables mainly held by the Chinese government and its a liates, who assume signi cant control of the rms. Tradable shares were largely owned by institutional and individual shareholders. The split-share structure reform was initiated by the Chinese government to convert non-tradable A-shares to tradable shares in an e ort to revitalize the Chinese stock market, which has been bearish since its initial partial share issue privatization (SIP) in 1990s (Liao et al: (2008) ).
Since the original costs of non-tradable shares were signi cantly lower than the market prices of tradable shares, non-tradable shareholders, represented by rm management, were required by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the Chinese counterpart of the SEC in the United States, hereafter CSRC) to negotiate with tradable shareholders to deliver a compensation package to the latter. A reform plan will only be passed if it contains a compensation package that is approved by at least 2/3 of tradable shareholders. Institutional shareholders, who held more than 20 percent of the total tradable shares in 2006 (Source:
the WIND database), will play an important role in compensation package negotiations and approval.
In the same spirit as Woidtke (2002), we use the percentage of tradable shares held by institutional shareholders as a proxy for shareholder activism. The larger stake institutional shareholders have in a rm, the more incentive they will have in monitoring and getting involved in rm management. We propose three sets of measures for the e ectiveness of shareholder activism on in uencing managerial behaviors and rm values: consideration, positive promises made to tradable shareholders and abnormal stock returns around reform plan approval date. Consideration is measured as the number of shares that non-tradable shareholders transferred to tradable shareholders in exchange for the trading right for their non-tradable shares. Consideration and positive promises will capture the in uence of institutional shareholder activism on managerial decisions, while abnormal stock returns around reform plan approval date will re ect the impacts of activism on rm performance and rm value.
Institutional shareholders face potential con icts of interests in monitoring rm management. Therefore, shareholder activism may have opposite e ects on managerial decisions. Pound (1988) propose three hypotheses that predict contradictory relationships between rm performance and institutional ownership. We nd that the impacts of shareholder activism on rm management are in uenced by segmented institutional ownerships of tradable shares.
Particularly, The value of consideration tends to be higher when institutional shareholders hold a larger percentage of tradable shares. In this case, shareholder activism plays a positive and e ective role in a ecting managerial decisions for tradable shareholders' interests. However, considerations turn to be relatively lower when institutional shareholders own a small percentage of the rms' tradable shares. Evidence suggests that institutional shareholders get actively involved in rm decision making to pursue di erent agendas in exchange for private bene ts, rather than seeking higher compensation values. We demonstrate that shareholder activism could have both positive and negative impacts in the presence of institutional shareholders' interest con icts.
Our analysis in general supports the argument that shareholder activism helps to improve rm performance and value. Positive promises made by rm management, though containing no direct monetary values, could lead to potential increases in rm and equity values. We nd that the number of positive promises is positively correlated to institutional shareholding. In addition, the result reports both economically and statistically signi cant positive relationships between abnormal stock returns and institutional shareholding.
Institutional shareholders may take three types of actions when they are unsatis ed with a rm's management. They could choose to vote with their feet -selling their stocks of the rm.
They may get actively involved in corporate governance to in uence managerial behaviors, as suggested by activism. Alternatively, they may choose to remain silent. Hirschman (1971) summarize those shareholder actions into three categories: exit, voice and loyalty. The previous literature on examining shareholder activism use shareholder proposals as proxies for shareholder activism. Mixed results were found on shareholder activism's impacts on corporate governance and rm performance. Among others, Smith (1996) , Strickland et al: (1996) , Carleton et al: (1998) and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) nd evidence that supports the success of shareholder activism, while Karpo et al: (1996) , Wahal (1996) and Gillan and Starks (2000) nd the opposite.
The disagreement among the previous studies arises from the complexities in selecting shareholder activism proxies and from the di culties in measuring their e ectiveness (Karpo (2001) and Gillan and Starks (1998) ). For instance, it is hard, if possible, to assure that the changes in rm performance are entirely driven by shareholder proposals. Other events, such as changing board members and modifying corporate charters, may a ect rm performance and value as well. Furthermore, changing corporate management may not necessarily lead to changes in rm performance. An additional complication is that institutional shareholders usually negotiate with rm management privately, rather than publicly, to in uence rm decisions. To solve the problems, researchers consider institutional shareholder ownership as a proxy for shareholder activism. Institutional investors would have more incentives in monitoring and in uencing management, in both public and private ways, if they have greater interest in a rm. Carvell and Strebel (1987) and Edelman and Baker (1990) Hypothesis 2: There exists a positive relationship between the probability of rm management/nontradable shareholders making positive promises and shareholder activism.
Feng and Xu (2006) report an average of 3% abnormal stock returns on reform plan approval days. The magnitude of abnormal stock returns will re ect the aggregate market expectations on how shareholder activism a ects rm future values. Following the e cient monitoring hypothesis, we expect a positive relationship between the abnormal returns and shareholder activism. On the other hand, the con ict of interest and strategic alignment hypotheses suggest a negative relationship. Thus, we propose and test a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: There exist positive relationships between cumulative abnormal returns around reform plan approval and shareholder activism.
Data
Our data on compensation packages, including considerations and promises, of the splitshare reform comes from the WIND database, which is widely used by major research and nancial institutions. Firm characteristics, stock returns and institutional shareholding data are obtained from the Tsinghua University Data Center and the WIND database respectively.
Our original data contain 1223 rms that completed their split-share structure reforms as of 30 June 2007. We eliminated 11 nancial rms, who themselves are institutional shareholders.
We further excluded 75 rms that were publicly listed less than two years before their reforms to improve the reliability of our measures of rm characteristics. Moreover, 42 rms with incomplete nancial information were excluded. Our nal sample contains 1095 rms, among the fact that our sample includes almost all publicly listed companies in the Chinese stock market, con rming that our analysis is immune to self-selection bias.
Methodology
We follow Woidtke (2002) to use the percentage of tradable shares held by institutional investors as a proxy for shareholder activism. The idea behind our choice of activism proxy is that the larger stake institutional shareholders have in a rm, the more incentive they will have in monitoring and getting involved in rm management. We use three sets of explanatory variables to measure shareholder activism's impacts on managerial decisions and rm performance in our regression analysis. They are consideration (CON S), positive promises made by rm management (P P s) and cumulative abnormal stock returns around reform plan approval date (CARs). We will formally introduce those variables below. Particularly, consideration and positive promises capture the impacts of activism on managerial decisions.
Abnormal stock returns re ect the aggregate market expectations on the e ects of activism on the improvement of rm future performance and value. Our prior is that positive relationships between the explanatory variables and institutional ownership would suggest that the presence of shareholder activism has positive in uence on managerial behaviors and rm performance, ceteris paribus.
We use the following regressions to analyze the impacts of shareholder activism on consideration and cumulative abnormal returns: Consideration represents the number of non-tradable shares transferred to tradable shareholders for every ten tradable shares they hold. In order to gain trading right for their nontradable shares, non-tradable shareholders need to transfer some of their non-tradable shares to tradable shareholders of the same rm as compensation, given the fact that the original costs of non-tradable shares were signi cantly lower than the current market prices of tradable shares. Our measure of consideration takes into account a variety of share transfer forms (in cash, share transfer or issuing warrant). Tradable shareholders are supposed to be better o with higher considerations.
The stock prices incorporate and react to a variety of information on rm future performance. As shown in Figure 1 , positive abnormal stock returns are observed around reform plan announcement dates, suggesting that the market expects split-share structure reform plans to increase long-term rm and equity values. We measure 3-day, 5-day and 11-day cumulative abnormal returns, denoted by CAR3, CAR5 and CAR11 respectively, around reform plan approval dates. We expect positive relationships between the abnormal returns and shareholder activism.
[insert Figure 1 here]
We use the Ordinal Logit regression to examine the interaction between positive promises and shareholder activism:
We include four types of positive promises made by rm management, who represent nontradable shareholders or are non-tradable shareholders themselves. Those promises include promise to increase shareholding by controlling shareholders (P I), promise for future dividend payments (P D), promise for capital injection by controlling shareholders (P C) and other types of positive promises (P O). For each promise category, we assign 1 if the rm makes at least one promise of the type and 0 for no promise made. 3 In addition, We create a total promise (P T ) variable that equals the sum of the four positive promise dummy values to measure the overall quantity of positive promises made by a rm. A larger number for this total promise variable implies a greater bene t for tradable shareholders in reform plan negotiations. We expect a positive correlation between shareholder activism and positive promises made.
[insert Table 1 here] Table 1 describes the statistics of the variables in the regressions. The CAR3, CAR5 and CAR11 are 10.3%, 10.7% and 14% respectively. Amongst control variables, we include rm size (SIZE), which is the natural log of rms' assets one year prior to the split-structure share reform. Growth (GW H) is computed using the average of the operating income growth rates observed in the two years prior to the reform. The average growth rate is 23.7% with a standard deviation of 56%. The oscillation is due to the fact that our sample rms come from 13 di erent industries classi ed by the CSRC. We include pro tability (P F Y ), which is the return on rm net assets one year before the reform. Other control variables for rm characteristics include market/book ratio (M B) and leverage ratio (LEV ). Yao et al: (2007) and Zheng et al: (2007) report a positive relationship between consideration and non-tradable share/total share ratio. Thus, we include the ratios of non-tradable shares over total shares outstanding (RN T ) to control for that e ect. We include rm beta (BET A) to control for market risk.
We use a set of dummy control variables as well. They include the batches of reform (BAT CH). The CSRC selected 30 rms as a pilot batch to carry out split-share reforms.
Those rms were of relatively good performance and low risk. We assign 0 to rms that were in the pilot batch and 1 to those were not. Firms that issue B-/H-shares may be subject to additional shocks and in uence compared to those issue A-shares only. We therefore include a dummy variable to specify whether a rm issues B-/H-shares besides A-shares. A dummy value 1 is assigned to rms that issue B-/H-shares besides A-shares.
A Chinese mainland rm may list its domestic A-shares on either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. To control for the exchange e ect, we include an exchange dummy (EXCH), for which we assign 1 (0) to rms listed on Shanghai (Shenzhen) Stock Exchange. We include a state control dummy (SOE) as well because approximately 72% rms in our sample are state-controlled. For the state control dummy, we assign 1 to rms that are state controlled and 0 to those are not. We include a industry dummy (IN D) to control for the industry e ect. Table 2 reports the correlations between the dependent variables. We nd that consideration is negatively correlated with positive promises at 1% signi cance level. That suggests that share transfer and positive promises could be used as substitutes to compensate non-tradable share-holders in reform negotiations. The positive and signi cant correlations between pairs of positive promises indicate that rms that made promises for dividend payments tend to make promises for share injections as well.
[insert Table 2 here]
The cumulative abnormal returns of di erent time window lengths tend to correlated positively and signi cantly. We notice that cumulative abnormal returns are negatively correlated with consideration and the total promises dummy. However, those negative relationships are statistically insigni cant. Since cumulative abnormal returns may be a ected by both consideration and promises, the impacts of consideration and positive promises could o set each other, given the negative correlation between the two. In addition, the CARs and positive promises could be simultaneously in uenced by other factors, such as institutional ownership. Therefore, the correlations reported in this table may not necessarily contradict our cross-sectional regression results.
3 Regression Analysis 3.1 Main Results Table 3 reports the regression results of the relationship between consideration and institutional shareholding. As reported in Column 6, the consideration is negatively (positively) [insert Table 3 here]
We omit share structure control variables and rm nancial variables in our model 1 and 2 regressions respectively. Model 3 regression includes all control variables. Amongst control variables, the coe cient of growth rate is 0:09 with a t-statistic of 3:95, suggesting that, for rms with greater growth opportunities, tradable shareholders are likely to demand less nontradable share transferred, because they could be alternatively compensated through gains in future rm growth. In the same vine, consideration appears negatively related with rm pro tability. However, that is not statistically signi cant. We nd consideration is positively correlated with state control dummy, suggesting that the non-tradable shareholders of stateowned rms are more willing to transfer more shares to tradable shareholders in exchange for the trading right for their shares. One potential explanation could be that the non-tradable shares of state-controlled rms have lower original costs compared to those of non-statecontrolled rms.
The non-tradable shareholders of rms of relatively higher non-tradable share/total share ratios transferred more shares to their tradable counterparts for compensation. The coecient of RN T is 3.28 and signi cant at 1% level. This is consistent with the ndings in Le and Yuan (2006) . In order to oat a large number of non-tradable shares in the market, non-tradable shareholder are more willing to pay higher compensation to tradable shareholders. The coe cient of 0:48 of B-/H-share dummy implies that rms that issue B-/H-shares pay relatively higher compensation to their tradable shareholders. Those rms have more incentives to send out positive signals to investors in B-/H-share markets. Table 4 depicts the testing results for Hypothesis 2 { the relationship between positive promises made by rm management and institutional shareholding. Column 2 to 11 report the regression results for total promise (P T ), promise to increase shareholding by controlling shareholders (P I), promise for future dividend payments (P D), promise for capital injection by controlling shareholders (P C) and other types of positive promises (P O) respectively.
[insert Table 4 here]
We nd that all positive promise measures are positively correlated to institutional ownership. Among them, P T , P C and P O are statistically signi cant at 1% level, and P D is signi cant at 5% level. The results con rm our Hypothesis 2 that there exists overall a positive relationship between the probability of rm management making positive promises in the reform and shareholder activism. Shareholder activism appears e ective in a ecting managerial decisions that lead to higher rm values in negotiations. Large non-tradable shareholders' promises for share purchases could reduce the interest con icts between the original non-tradable and tradable shareholders. Like Xu et al: (2008), we nd that management's promises for future dividend payments help to mitigate the managerial agency problems. All evidence supports Hypothesis 2. Table 5 illustrates the impacts of shareholder activism on the cumulative abnormal returns around reform announcement date.
[insert Table 5 here]
We nd that CAR3, CAR5 and CAR11 are all positively correlated with institutional ownership. That supports our Hypothesis 3 in that the market responded more positively to split-share structure reform plan approvals for rms whose shares were largely held by institutional investors. Given that market prices incorporate a variety of information about rm future performance and values, the results imply that institutional shareholder activism casts positive in uence on the improvements in rm performance.
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our ndings, we perform the same regressions on two subsamples { the percentages of tradable shares held by mutual funds and quali ed foreign institutional investors (QF II). For mutual funds, a major institutional investor group in the Chinese security markets, we nd qualitatively same results as those in the main results. Table 6 reports the regression results of the relationship between consideration and mutual fund shareholding. The consideration is negatively (positively) correlated with P IN (P IN SQ) with coe cients of 2:68 (3:34). The t-statistic indicates that the relationships are statistically signi cant at 1% level. The results con rm the existence of a nonlinear relationship between compensation value and mutual fund ownership, supporting our Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the coe cients reported in Table 6 are of higher values compared to those reported for the full-sample regression in Table 3 , indicating that mutual fund activism was more e ective in pursuit for higher consideration than other institutional investor activism.
[insert Table 6 here]
Column 2 to 11 of Table 7 report the regression results for the relationships between mutual fund activism and positive promises. We nd that all positive promise measures except for P I are positively correlated to mutual fund ownership. Among them, P T and P O are statistically signi cant at 1% level. P D and P C are signi cant at 10% level. The results are consistent with the ones in the full-sample regressions in that there exists an overall positive relationship between mutual fund activism and the probability of rm management making positive promises.
[insert Table 7 here] Table 8 reports the impacts of mutual fund activism on cumulative abnormal returns around reform announcement dates. We nd that CAR3, CAR5 and CAR11 are positively correlated with mutual fund ownership. Both the coe cients and statistical signi cance levels are higher compared to those in the full sample results, suggesting that the market reacted more positively to the news of reform approvals for rms whose shares are largely held by mutual funds. The overall evidence indicates that mutual funds appear to play an active role in the split-share structure reforms.
[insert Table 8 here]
In an unreported regression analysis, we perform the same tests with quali ed foreign institutional investor (QF II) ownerships. For all three sets of e ectiveness measures, we do not nd signi cantly positive relationships. The results suggest that quali ed foreign institutional investors are not in uential on Chinese companies' corporate governance.
Conclusions
Shareholder activism is broadly de ned as shareholders actions to in uence managerial decisions and rm performance. In this paper, we examine the value of shareholder activism in This table reports the correlations of dependent variables. CON S denotes consideration. P T denotes total positive promises. P I denotes promise for equity purchase. P D denotes promise for dividend payments. P C denotes promise for capital injection. CAR3; 5; 11 denote 3-,5-11-day cumulative abnormal returns respectively. Note: *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% signi…cance levels respectively (two-tails). BAT CH denotes reform batch. P I denotes promise to increase shareholdings by controlling shareholders. P D denotes promise for future dividend payments. P C denotes promise for capital injection by controlling shareholders. P O denotes other types of positive promises, and P T denotes total promise. Note: *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% signi…cance levels respectively (two-tails). P T P I P D P C P O
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